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Abstract
This paper presents a model featuring variable utilization rates across firms due
to production inflexibilities and idiosyncratic demand uncertainty. Within a New
Keynesian framework, we show how the corresponding bottlenecks and stock-outs
generate asymmetries in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. We derive
an expression for the Phillips curve where the dynamics of inflation depend on real
marginal costs and on a measure of resource underutilization.
JEL Classification: E52, E42, E31, E13
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1 Introduction
This paper addresses the following two questions: (i) What are the implications of produc-
tion inflexibilities for the transmission mechanism of monetary policy?; (ii) How should
monetary policy be conducted in this environment?.
Production inflexibilities arises in the economy when firms cannot immediately adapt
their production possibilities to meet changes in their environment. Specifically, firms find
it difficult to modify their capacity to produce goods in the short-run, giving rise to supply
shortages and production bottlenecks. One important implication due to the existence of
capacity constraints is that the response of macroeconomic variables to aggregate distur-
bances or to policy actions is asymmetric: similar actions or shocks are likely to generate
quantitatively different macroeconomic effects. A significant number of empirical studies
have found asymmetry in the real effects of monetary policy.1 Cover (1992), Karras (1996)
provide evidence of asymmetries between positive and negative monetary shocks on output
and prices, while Weise (1999) and Lo and Piger (2002) find that monetary shocks have
dramatically different effects over the business cycle.2
In this paper, we develop an analytical framework consistent with the aforementioned
features of the monetary transmission mechanism. This framework consists of a dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium model which displays the non-neutralities of money needed
to perform policy analysis in the short run and production inflexibilities that are able to
generate an asymmetric dynamic behavior of key macroeconomic variables. Specifically,
the model developed in this paper has two basic ingredients: (i) It incorporates a real side
with production inflexibilities that result in variable rates of utilization across firms; (ii)
It considers nominal rigidities that create short-run real effects of monetary policy.
The first element of the model is due to three basic features: first, the limited possi-
bilities of a short run substitutability between production factors; second, the existence
of uncertainty at the time of capacity choices, which explains the presence of underuti-
lized equipments; and third, the existence of idiosyncratic uncertainty which results in a
non-degenerated distribution of utilization rates across firms. In equilibrium, a proportion
of firms face demand shortages and have idle capacities, while others are at full capacity
and are unable to serve any extra demand. The second basic element of the model is a
monetary side with new-keynesian-type nominal rigidities. Specifically, it is assumed that
it is costly for firms to increase the price level above a stable value. This may reflect costs
of advertising or that erratic pricing causes consumers dissatisfaction.
The interaction between resource underutilization and monetary policy has recently
been the object of attention in the monetary macroeconomics literature. For instance, Dot-
sey and King (2001) and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2001) have considered it a
key element of their analysis. However, the description of the underutilization phenomenon
in these papers is highly stylized. Their modeling approach is based upon the endogenous
depreciation models of Greenwood et al (1989). By contrast, the issue of capacity utiliza-
tion is modeled here under explicit microfoundations. In this regard, we follow Gilchrist
1Some authors postulate the existence of asymmetric nominal price and/or wage rigidities as a rationale
in this regard -see Ball and Mankiw (1994) and Stiglitz (1986). Another strand in the literature emphasizes
the role credit market imperfections in the monetary transmission mechanism. See, for instance, Bernanke,
Gertler and Gilchrist (1999).
2Similar results are obtained in Peersman and Smets (2001) for several European countries.
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and Williams (2000) and, particularly, Fagnart, Licandro and Portier (1999) by modeling
very explicitly key features of the production sector, such as idiosyncratic uncertainty, firm
heterogeneity and the absence of an aggregate production function. All these elements are
embedded in a monopolistic competitive environment, where the endogenous behavior of
mark-ups plays a crucial role in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy.
The model developed in this paper follows this latter approach. Equipped with it,
we are able to deal with the first question posed above. Specifically, we show how the
proportion of firms with idle capacities crucially influences the response of the economy
to monetary policy stimulus. In particular, the existence of production inflexibilities due
to a low short-run capital-labor substitutability induces a “capacity” effect of a tight
link between changes in capacity and employment, output and prices. This feature of
the model will ultimately determine the intensity of the real effects of monetary policy.
Moreover, the model presented in this paper successfully replicates the dynamics of key
variables observed in the aggregate data. In particular, the model produces a “hump-
shaped” response of key macroeconomic variables to a monetary policy shock, a feature
that is consistent with the main findings of the identified VAR research.3
The second question approached in this paper asks how the existence of production
inflexibilities influences the appropriate conduct of monetary policy. In order to analyze
this issue, we consider a version of the model with staggered price mechanism à la Calvo
(1983); Albeit observationally equivalent to quadratic adjustment costs, it has received
much of the attention in the recent New-Keynesian (NK) literature. In a model without
capital accumulation and exogenous maximum productive capacity, we show how the
Phillips curve depends on the distribution of the utilization rates across firms. Under
the basic formulation of the NK Phillips curve, the dynamics of inflation are related to a
measure of economic activity that is based on real marginal costs. Our results point to
convenience of including, additionally, a measure of the dispersion of resource utilization.
This paper provides a theoretically-based measure in this regard.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a formal description of the model’s
behavioral aspects. Section 3 offers a characterization of the general equilibrium of the
economy and its qualitative properties. The implications for the transmission mechanism
of monetary policy are analyzed in Section 4. Section 5 presents a version of the model with
staggered pricing and studies the implications of production inflexibilities for the nature
of the Phillips curve and the characterization of a simple zero-inflation monetary policy
rule. Section 6, offers some concluding remarks and plausible lines for further research.
2 The Model Economy
The model economy consists of households, a central bank in charge of the conduct of
monetary policy and two productive sectors: a competitive sector producing a final good
and a monopolistic sector providing intermediate goods. These intermediate goods are
the only inputs necessary for the production of the final good. The final good can be
used either for consumption or for investment purposes. Capital and labor are used in
the production of intermediate goods by means of a putty-clay technology. Capital and
labor are substitutes ex ante, i.e., before investing, but complement ex post, i.e., when
3See Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999) for a survey.
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equipment is installed. This implies that each firm makes a capacity choice when invest-
ing. This specification of the production function allows for the introduction of a simple,
but realistic, concept of capacity. Each input firm makes its investment, pricing and em-
ployment decisions under idiosyncratic demand uncertainty, that is, before knowing the
exact demand for its production. The particular specification in this regard, which follows
Ireland (1997, 2001) assumes a quadratic function for these costs.
The structure of the model implies that intermediate goods firms can be either sales
or capacity constrained; it also allows different firms to face different capacity constraints.
Consequently, the idiosyncratic uncertainty is what explains the presence of heterogene-
ity between firms at equilibrium regarding the degree of utilization of their productive
capacities.4
2.1 Final Good Firms
At time t, a single final good, denoted by Y , is produced by a representative firm which sells
it in a perfectly competitive market. Such commodity can either be used for consumption
or for investment. There is no fixed input, which implies that the optimization program of
these firms remain purely static. The production activities are carried out by combining
a continuum of intermediate goods, indexed by j ∈ [0, 1] . The production technology is
represented by a constant return-to-scale CES function defined as follows
Yt =
·Z 1
0
Y
²−1
²
j,t v
1
²
j,tdj
¸ ²
²−1
, (1)
with ² > 1 being the elasticity of substitution of inputs and where Yj,t is the quantity of
input j used in production at date t. Here, vj,t ≥ 0 is a productivity parameter corre-
sponding to input j. It is assumed to be drawn from a stochastic process i.i.d. distributed
across time and input firms, with a log normal distribution function F(v) that has unit
mean and is defined over the support [0,∞). The representative firm purchases inputs to
intermediate good firms taking into account that the supply of each input j is limited to
an amount Y¯j,t. Assuming a uniform non-stochastic rationing scheme, the optimization
program of the final firm can be written as follows
max
{Yt,Yj,t}
PtYt −
Z 1
0
Pj,tYj,tdj , (2)
where Pt is the price of the final good which is taken as given by the firm. When max-
imizing profits, the final firm faces no uncertainty: it knows the input prices {Pj,t}, the
input supply constraints
©
Y¯j,t
ª
and the productivity parameters {vj,t}. The solution to
(2 determines the quantity demanded by the final good firm of the goods produced by
each intermediate firm. Under deterministic quantity constraints and a uniform rationing
scheme, effective demands are not well defined. Realized transactions can be derived, how-
ever. The quantity of inputs used will be determined by the corresponding idiosyncratic
productivity level of each intermediate firm as described in the next result:
4 In order to keep the model tractable, it is assumed that the idiosyncratic shock is not serially corre-
lated. Its realization influences exclusively contemporary production and employment decisions, but not
investment decisions.
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Lemma 1 (Realized Transactions) The optimal allocation of inputs across intermedi-
ate good firms is given by the following system of equations
Yj,t =
(
Ytvj,t
³
Pj,t
Pt
´−²
if 0 ≤ vj,t ≤ v¯j,t
Y¯j,t otherwise
(3)
with
v˜j,t =
Y¯j,t
Yt
³
Pj,t
Pt
´−² . (4)
The variable v˜j,t determines the critical value of the productivity parameter vj,t for
which the unconstrained demand equals the supply constraint Y¯j,t. The term (Pj,t/Pt)
−²
appearing in the demand function of a firm with excess capacities represents, at given
Yt, the positive spillover effects an input producing firm with idle resources benefits from.
This term is going to play a significant role in the model’s behavior, as will be stressed
later.
As mentioned above, for tractability purposes it will be assumed that all intermediate
firms are ex ante equal. This symmetry means that input prices and capacities are the
same across firms. Assuming that a law of large numbers applies in the present context,
the final output supply can be expressed as follows
Yt =
·Z ∞
0
Y
²−1
²
j,t v
1
²
j,tdF (v)
¸ ²
²−1
(5)
or taking into account equation (3),
Yt =



"µ
Pj,t
Pt
¶−²
Yt
# ²−1
² Z v˜t
0
vdF (v) + Y¯
²−1
²
t
Z ∞
v˜t
v
1
² dF (v)



²
²−1
. (6)
Recall that F(v) is the distribution function of idiosyncratic shocks; thus, for a proportion
F(v˜) of intermediate firms, the realized value of the productivity parameter is below v˜.
2.2 Intermediate Good Firms
In this sector, each intermediate good is produced by a monopolistically competitive firm
making use of capital and labor, which are combined for production through a putty-clay
technology. Firms are ex ante identical, thus, the notation is simplified by omitting index
j. These firms start period t with a predetermined level of capacity. Such a production
plan cannot be adapted to the needs of the firm within the period. Hence, investment
achieved during period t − 1 becomes productive at date t. Investment consists of the
design of a production plan by simultaneously choosing a quantity of capital goods Kt
and employment capacity Nt according to the following Cobb-Douglas technology:
Y¯t = AtK
α
t N
1−α
t (7)
where 0 < α < 1 and At ≡ exp (zt) is a productivity parameter, which evolves over time
according to
zt = ρzzt−1 + εz,t, (8)
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where εz,t is an i.i.d. technology shock and 0 < ρz < 1. The variable Nt represents the
maximum number of available work-stations in the firm. Hence, the firm is at full capacity
when all these work-stations are operating full-time. As it is common in models featuring
a putty-clay technology, it is convenient to express investment decision as the choice of
both Kt and a capital-labor ratio Xt ≡ Kt/Nt. Consequently, the expression in (7) can be
rewritten as
Y¯t = AtX
α−1
t Kt,
from where the technical productivity of the installed equipments can be deduced. For
the case of capital, it is given by AtXα−1t , whereas AtX
α
t represents that of labor, so
that this production function displays constant returns-to-scale in the within-period labor
input. In particular, if the firm j uses a quantity of labor Ldj,t smaller than Nt, it then
produces AtXαt L
d
j,t units of intermediate good. Once the idiosyncratic (demand) shock
vj,t is revealed, the firm instantaneously adjusts its labor demand Ldj,t to cover the needs
of its production plan, Yj,t, that is,
Ldj,t =
Yj,t
AtXαt
=
1
AtXαt
min
(
Ytvj,t
µ
Pt
Pt
¶−²
, Y¯t
)
. (9)
2.2.1 The intertemporal decisions
Each intermediate goods firm chooses a price and a capacity level in order to maximize
the stream of expected future nominal profits, D, that is,
max
Pt,Kt+1,Xt+1
Et
( ∞X
s=t
ρsDs
)
, (10)
where ρs is the stochastic discount factor of the firm, which represents a pricing kernel for
contingent claims. Assuming that households and firms have access to a complete set of
frictionless securities markets, one obtains the following equilibrium expression
ρs = β
s∆s,
where ∆s corresponds to the representative household’s relative valuation of cash across
time, that is, the marginal utility value to the household of an additional dollar in profits
received during period s, measured in terms of consumption, that is,
∆s =
Uc,s
Ps
. (11)
Alternatively, the maximization problem can be written in a recursive manner as
V (Pt−1,Kt,Xt,Ωt) = max
Pt,Kt+1,Xt+1
½
Dt + βEt
½
∆t+τ+1
∆t+τ
V (Pt,Kt+1,Xt+1,Ωt+1)
¾¾
,
where V (·) is the value function satisfying the Bellman-equation, in which Ωt is the infor-
mational set of the typical input firm j. The ex ante nominal dividends for such a firm in
period t is given by
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Dt = PtEv {Yt}−WtLdj,t −Pt
¡
IAt +Ap,tYt
¢
.
where
IAt = It (1 +Ak,t)
is investment in capital goods plus adjustment costs in capital, that is,
It = Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt
and
Ak,t = φk
2
µ
It
Kt
− δ
¶2
with δ being the capital’s depreciation rate and φkis the adjustment cost scale parameter
for capital. This functional form produces zero steady-state adjustment costs.5 The term
Ap,t is the cost of adjusting the nominal price, and it is specified as a quadratic function
Ap,t =
φp
2
µ
Pt
πPt−1
− 1
¶2
,
where π is the steady state inflation rate. Notice that these costs are measured in terms
of the final good. Firms’ maximization problem is subject to the expected demand re-
sulting from the realization of the idiosyncratic shock, which can be derived directly from
expression (3),
Ev {Yt} =
µ
Pt
Pt
¶−²
Yt
Z v˜t
0
vdF (v) + Y¯t
Z ∞
v˜t
dF (v) . (12)
2.2.2 The price setting problem
After observing the aggregate shocks, but before knowing the idiosyncratic one, input
producing firms take their price decisions. Input prices are announced on the basis of
(rational) expectations, before the exact value of the demand for their production is real-
ized. This price-setting assumption has the advantage of giving a symmetric equilibrium
in prices, avoiding in this manner price aggregation difficulties. The price decision is dy-
namic and the same rule will be followed by all firms given that, ex ante, all of them are
identical, that is, Pt = Pj,t. Taking into account these considerations, the optimal price
decision can be characterized by the following result:
Lemma 2 (Intermediate-Goods Pricing) The price decision of any input firm j at
date t satisfies the following relation:
Pt =
²Γ (v˜t)
(²Γ (v˜t)− 1)
·
Wt
AtXαt
− φpEt {∆tΥt − β∆t+1Υt+1}
¸
, (13)
where
Υt+h =
µ
Pt+h
πPt+h−1
− 1
¶µ
Pt+h
πPt+h−1
¶
Yt+hPt+h
Ev {Yt+h−1} for h = 0, 1
5Quadratic costs are justified on the ground that it is easier to absorb new capacity into the firm at a
slow rate -see Kim (2001).
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and where Γ (v˜t) represents the probability of excess capacity in the economy, that is, Γ (v˜t)
is a weighted measure of the proportion of firms for which demand is smaller than their
productive capacity,
Γ (v˜t) =
(Pt/Pt)
−² Yt
Ev {Yt}
Z v˜t
0
vdF (v) .
Notice that Γ (v˜) depends only on v˜, as becomes clear from the combination of equations
(12) and (4) above,
Γ (v˜t) =
R v˜t
0 vdF (v)R v˜t
0 vdF (v) + v˜t
R∞
v˜t
dF (v)
. (14)
The pricing mechanism resulting from (13) implies that intermediate firms set their price
as a mark-up over expected future demand and marginal costs.6 The precise nature
of the mark-up will be discussed later. The above solution satisfies also the following
transversality condition
lim
τ→∞
Et
½
βt+τ
∆t+τ+1
∆t+τ
∂Vt+τ+1
∂Pt+τ
Pt+τ
¾
= 0.
2.2.3 The Capacity and Investment Choice
The next step in the description of the behavior of intermediate goods firms corresponds
to the choice of the productive capacity to be installed. Firms choose a contingency plan
{Kt+1,Xt+1}∞t=o to maximize the expected discounted value of the dividend flow given in
(10). The first order conditions are summarized in the following result
Lemma 3 (Capacity Choice) The optimal decision of investment in capital Kt+1 and
capital-labor ratio Xt+1 is given, respectively, by the following Euler equations
Et {∆t (Ψt +Wt)Pt}−Et
½
∆t+1
µ
(1− δ)Ψt+1 +
µ
Kt+2
Kt+1
¶
Wt+1
¶
Pt+1
¾
= (15)
Et
½
∆t+1 (1− F (v˜t+1))Φt+1
µ
Y¯t+1
Kt+1
¶
Pt+1
¾
and
Et
(
∆t+1Φt+1
µ
Y¯t+1
Xt+1
¶"µ
α (²− 1)
v˜t+1
¶Z v˜t+1
0
vdF (v)−
Z ∞
v˜t+1
dF (v)
#)
= 0, (16)
where
Ψt+h = 1 +
φk
2
µ
It+h
Kt+h
− δ
¶2
with h=0,1
the term
Wt+h = It+h
µ
Kt+1+h
Kt+h
− 1
¶
φk
Kt+h
with h=0,1
6The derivation of this condition supposes that each monopolistic firm only considers the direct ef-
fect of its price decision on demand and neglects all indirect effects (e.g. the effects through Yt). This
approximation is reasonable in a context where there is a continuum of firms.
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and
Φt+1 ≡
µ
Pt+1 −
Wt+1
AtXαt+1
¶
.
The first equation states that the optimal capital stock is such that the expected user
cost of capital, including adjustment costs, is equal to its expected revenue, which is given
by the discounted increase in profits generated by an additional unit of capital corrected
by the probability of operating such unit. Notice that in the absence of adjustment costs,
Ψt+h = 1 and Wt+h = 0. Also notice that in the steady state, there are not adjustment
costs of investment. From the second equation one can observe the trade-off faced by
the intermediate firm when choosing the optimal capital-labor ratio. When increasing
the capital-labor ratio, the firm increases its labor productivity, which is given by AtXαt ,
something that has a favorable effect on its competitive position in case of excess capacities.
However, increasing Xt means that the maximum level of employment available in period t
will be lower, and likewise the maximum volume of sales of the firm. The optimal capital-
labor ratio will be such that the two opposite effects on expected profits are equal in the
margin. In solving the problem, we have imposed the transversality conditions for the
stock of capital
lim
τ→∞
Et
½
βt+τ
∆t+1+τ
∆t+1+τ
∂Vt+1+τ
∂Kt+1+τ
Kt+1+τ
¾
= 0,
as well as for the capital-labor ratio
lim
τ→∞
Et
½
βt+τ
∆t+1+τ
∆t+τ
∂Vt+1+τ
∂Xt+1+τ
Xt+1+τ
¾
= 0.
2.3 Households
The economy is populated by a continuum of homogeneous households of unit measure.
These agents value alternative stochastic streams of a (composite) consumption good Ct,
real balances Mdt /Pt and labor L
s
t , according to the following lifetime expected utility
function
E0
( ∞X
t=0
βt
·
u
µ
C∗t ,
Mdt
Pt
; ξt
¶
+ V (1− Lst )
¸)
(17)
where β > 0 represents households’ intertemporal discount factor.7 Household’s prefer-
ences take into account past consumption as well as present consumption. Thus, C∗t =
Ct + bCt−1 so that whenever b > 0, household’s value habit formation in consumption. ξt
represents a preference shock that follows an autoregressive process:
ln ξt =
¡
1− ρξ
¢
ξ + ρξ ln ξt−1 + εt,ξ,
with 1 > ρξ > −1, ξ > 0 and εξ,t a zero-mean serially uncorrelated innovation normally
distributed with standard deviation σξ.
The household begins period t holding an amount Mdt−1 of liquid assets that represent
the economy’s stock of money (a non interest bearing asset) and an amount Bt−1 of
7The assumption of separability between the basket formed by consumption and real balances and hours
implies that aggregate demand relationships are invariant to the specification of the firm’s problem.
14
discount bonds with a nominal return of Rt. It receives a wage payment of WtLst , a lump-
sum transfer, Tt, from the central bank and firm profits, Dt.
PtCt +
³
Mdt −Mdt−1
´
+R−1t Bt −Bt−1 =WtLst +Dt + Tt. (18)
Thus, the representative household’s budget constraint states that consumption expendi-
tures plus assets accumulation must equal disposable income. A No-Ponzi-Game condition
is imposed on households’ borrowing: it requires debt not to increase asymptotically faster
than the interest rate. The optimal behavior of the household is characterized as follows:
Lemma 4 The optimal conditions for consumption and real balances are given by
uC,t
Pt
= βEt
½
Rt
uC,t+1
Pt+1
¾
, (19)
and
uC,t
Pt
= βEt
½
uC,t+1
Pt+1
¾
+
uM/P,t
Pt
, (20)
where UC and UM/P denote, respectively, the partial derivatives of U with respect to C
and M/P. The first order necessary condition for labor supply is characterized by
−VLt
uCt
=
Wt
Pt
, (21)
where VL is the derivative of V with respect to L.
The formulation and results in this section are rather standard within the monetary
DSGE literature. Equation (19) is a standard Euler consumption relation, while (21)
governs the household’s labor supply decision. Combining (19) with (20), it is possible to
obtain the following relation
uM/P,t
uc,t
= 1− 1
Rt
, (22)
which implicitly defines a money demand function that depends positively on consumption
and negatively on the nominal interest rate. This latter result is attributable to the
opportunity cost of holding money.
2.4 The Monetary Authority
At each period of time, the central bank decides the amount of money to introduce into
the economy in order to achieve a given objective or target. The stock of money is given
through a transfer, Tt, to the households. Specifically,
Tt =Mt+1 −Mt,
with the money supply growing at a gross rate µt
Mt+1 −Mt
Mt
= µt. (23)
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We consider two possible implementations of monetary policy: In the first one, the central
bank follows an exogenous money growth rule of the form
µt =
¡
1− ρµ
¢
µ+ ρµµt−1 + εµ,t . (24)
where ρµ is the persistence parameter and the monetary policy shock εµ,t is assumed to be
i.i.d. with zero mean and standard deviation σµ. A second implementation of monetary
policy is based on an endogenous nominal interest rate rule. In this case, the monetary
authority allows µt to adjust in a way which ensures that an endogenous interest rate rule
of the following form
Rt = f (Ωt) + εR,t (25)
holds, where f (·) is a function of the variables tracked by the central bank which are
given in the information set Ω. The term εR,t represents exogenous policy actions by
the monetary authority. One can interpret this rule as a relationship that the monetary
authority sustains in equilibrium by appropriately manipulating the money supply. To
do so, µt has to respond in a particular way to the current and past values of all the
fundamental shocks hitting the economy. Below, we consider different variants of the
monetary policy rule in (25) and analyze their implications in the present framework
2.5 Dynamic General Equilibrium
An equilibrium for this model can be defined in the usual way. We first consider the case in
which the central banks follow an exogenous money growth rule: given the initial produc-
tive equipments K0 and X0, the initial state of the technology A0, with its corresponding
stochastic process (8), the initial monetary growth rate µ0 with the exogenous process
(24), the initial input goods price P0, an equilibrium for the model economy described
above is stated as follows:
De finiti on 5 ( Equi li bri um with Exogenous Pol icy) The general  equilibrium  of the econ-
omy dur ing any pe ri od t ≥ 0 is gi ven by a st och astic process for p rices {Pt, Pt , Rt ,Wt ,∆t}∞ t=0 ,
a quantity vector {Kt,Xt, Ct, Bt, Lt, Yt,Mt}∞t=0 and a proportion of  firms {F (v˜t )}∞t=0 that
result from the optimal choices (consistent with the available information) of the central
bank, the households and the firms. In an equilibrium, these choices are required to be
mad e under rat io na l e x pec ta ti ons and co ns is tent wi th t he market-clearing conditions in
the labor market, Lst = L
d
t , the money market, M
d
t =M
s
t , the bonds market, Bt = 0, and
the final goods market
Yt = Ct + I
N
t +Ap,tYt. (26)
Alternatively, we can define an equilibrium with an interest rate monetary policy rule.
In this case, the central bank adjusts the rate of growth of money supply µt to satisfy the
interest rate given by the rule (25). Hence, equations (20) and (23) are redundant. The
equilibrium can be defined, in this case, as follows:
Definition 6 (Equilibrium with Endogenous Policy) Given the endogenous mone-
tary policy rule (25) for the nominal interest rate Rt, the general equilibrium of the econ-
omy during any period t ≥ 0 is given by a stochastic process for prices {Pt, Pt,Wt,∆t}∞t=0 ,
a quantity vector {Kt,Xt, Ct, Bt, Lt, Yt,Mt}∞t=0 and a proportion of firms {F (v˜t)}∞t=0 that
result from the agents’ optimal choices and such that all markets clear.
16
Notice that in this model F(v˜t) represents the proportion of firms that, at equilibrium,
underuse their productive capacities, i.e., those for which vt ∈ [v¯, v˜t] . The variable Γ (v˜t)weights this proportion of firms by the relative importance of their production in total
output. An important feature of this equilibrium is its symmetry: all input firms j choose
the same capacity level and take the same pricing decisions. With all prices identical,
aggregate employment, denoted by Lt, is equal to individual expected employment levels
(up to a scaling factor):
Lt =
(Pt/Pt)
−² Yt
AtXαt
Z v˜t
0
vtdF (vt) +
Kt
Xt
Z ∞
v˜t
dF (vt) , (27)
where Kt and Xt stand for aggregate capital and capital/labor respectively at time t− 1
and available at time t, and
v˜t =
Y¯t
(Pt/Pt)
−² Yt
represents the ratio of productive capacity to expected demand for intermediate inputs.
Notice that, as vt < v˜t, the aggregate productive capacity is underutilized at equilibrium.
3 Asymmetries
This section explores the main insights and qualitative implications derived from the
model economy presented above. We first characterize the dynamic general equilibrium
associated to this economy, introducing next the important concept of aggregate capacity
utilization rate. This section concludes with an analysis of the implications that different
values of this variable has on the response of key macroeconomic variables to monetary
policy shocks.
3.1 Qualitative Analysis
The individual capacity utilization rates are given by:
Ct =
( ³
Pt
Pt
´−²
Ytvt/Y¯t if vt ≤ v˜t
1 if vt > v˜t
which introduced into (1) yields the aggregate capacity utilization rate,
Ct ≡ Yt
Y¯t
. (28)
For a given distribution F(vt) , and thus given σ2v, there is a decreasing relationship be-
tween the capacity utilization rate, Ct, and the weighted proportion of firms with idle
resources, Γ (v˜t) , which subsequently determines the mark-up rate. The aggregate ca-
pacity utilization rate is directly linked to the proportion of firms that produce at full
capacity, 1 − Γ (v˜t) . An important feature of the model is that the relative price of the
input producing firms, Pt/Pt, is less than one. Some manipulation of (6) allows one to
write relative prices as a function of v˜t, the proportion of firms with excess capacities:
Pt
Pt
=
µZ v˜t
0
vdF (v) + v˜
²−1
²
t
Z ∞
v˜t
v
1
² dF (v)
¶ 1²−1
. (29)
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The right hand side of this expression is increasing in v˜ and bounded above by one. As
a result, the spillover term (Pt/Pt)
−²is larger than one. Recall that the optimal price is
given by
Pt =
²Γ (v˜t)
(²Γ (v˜t)− 1)
·
Wt
AtXαt
−
φp
²
µ
Υt − βEt
½
∆t+1
∆t
Υt+1
¾¶¸
,
which can be rewritten as
Pt =
µ
1− 1
Θt
¶−1 Wt
AtXαt
. (30)
where the term µ
1− 1
Θt
¶−1
(31)
represents the mark-up of the price over the marginal cost; in this expression, the term
Θt is defined as
Θt = ²Γ (v˜t)
µ
1− φp
·
Υt − βEt
½
∆t+1
∆t
Υt+1
¾¸¶−1
,
where
Υt+h =
µ
Pt+h
πPt+h−1
− 1
¶µ
Pt+h
πPt+h−1
¶
Yt+hPt+h
Ev {Yt+h−1} , for h = 0, 1.
Notice that in the case of flexible prices, that is when φp = 0, the mark-up collapses to
Θ
flex
t =
µ
1− 1
²Γ (v˜t)
¶−1
.
The mark-up rate depends negatively on the (absolute) value of the price elasticity of
expected sales, which is defined as the elasticity of expected sales to expected demand,
Γ (v˜t), times the price elasticity of expected demand, ². This means that when Γ (v˜t) ,
the probability of a sales constraint, is large, that is, when more input firms are likely to
produce under their full capacity level, firm’s actual market power is reduced, implying
a smaller mark-up rate. At given price elasticity of demand, ², this implies a positive
relationship between the capacity utilization and mark-up rates. Notice also that when
no firm is capacity constrained, that is, no firm is producing at full capacity which implies
that Γ (v˜) = 1, the pricing rule is given a constant mark-up over the marginal cost as in
the standard monopolistic competition model.
Θ =
µ
1− 1
²
¶−1
.
In order to understand why the response of key macroeconomic variables to a monetary
policy shock depends on the degree of utilization of productive resources, a diagrammatic
representation of the labor and final goods market equilibrium, at given capacity level, is
presented. Figure 1 corresponds to the short-run labor market, where the upward sloping
curve represents the aggregate labor supply schedule, as given in equation (21). The other
curve, concave and sloping downwards, represents the macroeconomic labor demand curve
given in equation (27). In the very short run, at given capacity, the labor demand curve
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intersects both axes. The intersection with the horizontal axis is due to the fact that even
at zero real wage rates, the short-run demand for labor is bounded above by the maximum
number of work stations corresponding to the full employment of installed capacities.
Notice that when v˜ →v
¯
, equation (27) reduces to the following expression:
Lt =
Kt
Xt
.
In the opposite case, when all firms have idle resources, and thus underutilize their pro-
ductive capacities, the proportion of firms Γ (v˜t) = 1 and the real wage rate given in (30)
becomes,
Wt
Pt
=
µ
1− 1
Θ˜t
¶
AtX
α
t ,
with
Θ˜t = ²
·
1− φp
µ
Υt − βEt
½
∆t+1
∆t
Υt+1
¾¶¸−1
.
It must be pointed out that along the short-run labor demand curve there is a negative
relationship between the demand elasticity of sales, Γ (v˜t), and employment, Lt. Also, a
downward shift along the short-run labor demand curve increases the mark-up, since the
proportion of firms at full capacity is larger and so is the spill-over effect from constrained
to unconstrained firms. The implications of a monetary policy shock on the response of
the labor market are the following: when a monetary policy shock occurs, the marginal
revenue curve will shift upwards. As a result, output will increase and prices will also
increase, but less than in the fully flexible case, so that the markup will decrease. This
implies an upwards shift in the labor demand curve as shown in Figure 1. The maximum
feasible real wage rate increases; the short-run labor demand curve intersects now the
vertical axis at a higher value, consequently, real wages increase as well as the equilibrium
level of employment. At given capacity, output also increases. The real interest rate
decreases, what stimulates investment and consumption. It is important to notice that
the effects of the monetary disturbance will depend crucially on the capacity utilization
rate of the economy at the time of the shock. Hence, further expansionary policies will
have less impact on employment and a higher effect on prices.
3.2 Numerical Analysis
We proceed by numerically illustrating the main results derived from the model economy
presented above. The objective here is to analyze the implications of production inflexi-
bilities on the behavior of key macroeconomic variables in response to a monetary policy
shock. To that end, the model’s parameters are chosen in order to match the properties
of US data. Moreover, given the importance of non-linearities, we solve the model using
a numerical method that preserves these features of the model.
3.2.1 Parameter Values
The time period is one quarter. Table 1 summarizes the values of the calibrated parameters
which are described in the sequel. The parameter for preferences and technology are
assigned values that are standard in the DSGE literature; the discount factor is set at
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(β) = (1.03)−0.25 ; the utility function is assumed to be:
U (C∗t , Lt) ≡ ξtu (C∗t ) + V (Lst ) = ξt
C∗1−σt
1− σ + η
(1− Lt)1−ϕ
1− ϕ ,
where the risk aversion (σ) = 1, the consumption/leisure share in utility (η) = 0.35 so
that one third of the time endowment in the steady state corresponds to time engaged
in market activity; the inverse of the labor supply elasticity (ϕ) = 0.8, implying a value
of this elasticity of 1.25; the parameter corresponding to habit persistence is set equal to
(h) = 0.7 which is the value estimated by Boldrin, Christiano and Fisher (2001). Following
the estimates of Ireland (2001) the AR(1) preference shock, ξt has a coefficient
¡
ρξ
¢
= 0.9
a mean value (ξ) = 1 and an innovation with standard deviation (σξ) = 0.03.
Capital’s share on aggregate income (α) = 0.33; the annual depreciation rate of 10%
implies a value (δ) = 0.018; next, the parameter of the price adjustment function
¡
φp
¢
=
4.05 as suggested by Ireland (1997); the parameter for the adjustment costs of capital is
set equal to (φk) = 318, which is the value estimated by Kim (2001); estimates of average
mark-up by Fernald and Basu (1997) suggest a value of 1.2, however, with the standard
value for the elasticity of intermediate goods (²) = 6, our model produces a high mark-up
of 1.7; in order to reduce this magnitude, we have followed an argument similar to the
one in Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) and considered the possibility of introducing a
fixed cost of production; denoting by Ψ this fixed cost, the expression for the mark-up
(31) becomes µ
1− 1
Θt
¶−1
,
where now
Θt = ²Γ (v˜t)
·
1− φp
µ
Υt − βEt
½
∆t+1
∆t
Υt+1
¾¶
−Ψ
¸−1
,
which, evaluated at the non-stochastic steady state, is
Θ = ²Γ (v˜) (1−Ψ)−1 ;
thus, setting (η) = 0.3 and taking into account that the distribution of firms with idle
resources Γ (v˜) is chosen is in order to reproduce the average capacity utilization rate
measured by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System by setting the variance
of the idiosyncratic shock
¡
σ2v
¢
= 0.75, we obtain the desired level for the steady-state
mark-up.
Notice that the magnitude of the firm level uncertainty is measured through the vari-
ance of the idiosyncratic shock, denoted here by σ2v. In order to show the influence of σ
2
v
on the capacity utilization rate of the economy, recall from (14) that the distribution of
firms with idle resources is given by the following expression:
Γ (v˜t) =
R v˜t
0 vdF (v)R v˜t
0 vdF (v) + v˜t
R∞
v˜t
dF (v)
,
which, given the properties of the log normal distribution, becomes:8
Γ
¡
v˜t;σ2v
¢
=
Z (wt − nt)
Z (wt − nt) + v˜t [1−Z (wt)] ,
8See Johnson-Kotz-Balakrishnan (1994) for a detailed description of such properties.
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where Z (·) is the standard-normal cumulative distribution function and
wt =
ln (v˜t) + 0.5n
2
t
[ln (1 + σ2v)]
1/2
.
Figure 2 illustrates, by means of numerical arguments, the existence of a negative rela-
tionship between σ2v and the weighted proportion of firms at full capacity 1 − Γ (·) and,
consequently, with the average capacity utilization rate of the economy.
3.2.2 Solution Method
In order to solve and simulate the model, a numerical procedure is needed. Given the
important non-linearities that are inherent to the model, we adopt a solution method that
preserves these features. Specifically, we have considered a non-linear implementation of
the method of Eigenvalue-Eigenvector Decompositions proposed by Sims (2000). In this
solution approach, each conditional expectation is treated as an additional endogenous
variable and an equation is added to the model defining the expectation error. The
numerical solution is in the form of a set of time series for all the variables in the model,
including all the conditional expectations and the associated expectation errors. This
series are obtained from the original non-linear model which has been augmented with
some appropriate stability elements needed to guarantee that transversality conditions
will hold. These stability conditions are given by the left eigenvectors corresponding to
the unstable eigenvalues of the linear approximation to the model economy about the
non-stochastic steady-state.9
3.2.3 Results
This section analyses the model through a discussion of the dynamic behavior of selected
variables to temporary exogenous shocks. Specifically, Figure 3 shows the impulse response
functions of the model corresponding to a 1 % technology shock; Figure 4 illustrates the
dynamic responses due to a monetary policy action consisting of an unexpected increase
in the rate of growth of the money supply; and, finally, Figure 5 displays the marginal
responses of selected model variables to a series of cumulated monetary policy shocks.
This later exercise illustrates how such responses will differ as the economy moves away
from its steady state position.
Regarding technology shocks, zt, is assumed to follow an AR(1) stochastic process
with a coefficient (ρz) = 0.95; the associated disturbance term, εz,t, is a white noise with
standard deviation (σz) = 0.0065. The features of the model economy discussed in this
paper has several interesting implications regarding the response to a technology shock:
The first panel in Figure 3 shows the impulse response function of output. It is noticeable
the resulting hump-shape of this response. It must be pointed out that this result is
obtained al so in the absence of habit formation and adjustme nt costs of i nvestment. To
illustrate this, we computed the impulse responses for a baseline model in which these two
features were absent. The resulting impulse responses clearly show a hump-shape. For
instance the output reaction to the monetary policy shock in the period after the shock is
noticeably greater than that of the impact period -see Figure 7 below.
9Novales et al. (2000) offer a practical exposition of this numerical solution method. Appendix 2
describes in detail the implementation of this approach to the model economy presented in this paper.
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One key finding is the negative impact response of employment to the positive tech-
nology shock. The intuition is that the existence of nominal price rigidities imply that
aggregate demand increases less proportionately than the increase in productivity induced
by the technology shock. As Figure 3.b illustrates, aggregate employment must decline
accordingly. Such a decline is only on impact. Moreover, consumption smoothing and the
structure of preferences imply that real wages follow only partially the initial productivity
increase. Firms invest initially in less capital intensive technology, that is, the capital-
labor ratio decreases, making investment choices more favorable to employment. In this
manner, the following period employment increases so that the response of this variable is
greater than the instantaneous one. The technology shock increases the productive capac-
ity of input producing firms which is, however, of a higher magnitude than the increase in
output, so that the capacity utilization rate of the economy decreases as shown in Figure
3.c. Figure 3.d shows, next, the response of investment. The existence of adjustment costs
of capital makes the magnitude of such a response consistent with the pattern suggested in
the literature. Specifically, these costs reduce the elasticity of investment demand to the
real interest rate and restrain the increase in investment caused by the technology shock.
Figure 3.e displays the response of consumption to the technology disturbance. The con-
sideration of habit formation reduces the impact response of consumption, also rendering
the model consistent with the dynamics observed in aggregate data.10 Finally, Figure 3.f
displays the dynamic response of the mark-up. One can observe that the average mark-up
is procyclical. To understand this, notice that when a positive technology shock shifts the
marginal cost curve downward, input producing firms do not adjust their price fully and
so the mark-up increases.
Regarding the response to a monetary policy shock, the stock of money in the economy
grows stochastically as following the process
µt =
¡
1− ρµ
¢
µ+ ρµµt−1 + εµ;
the persistence parameter
¡
ρµ
¢
= 0.50 and the monetary policy shock εR,t is assumed to
be i.i.d. with zero mean and standard deviation (σµ) = 0.003. As shown in Figure 4,
a number of results are worth noting here. The model is able to reproduce the stylized
facts of monetary policy claimed in many studies of the identified VAR literature, such
as Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2001). In particular, an expansionary money
supply shock leads to an increase of output and employment. As illustrated in Figure
4.a and Figure 4.b, the model clearly generates “hump-shaped” responses in these two
variables, a feature strongly supported in the empirical literature. As in the case of a
technology shock, an explanation in this regard is that firms invest initially in less capital
intensive technology due to the fact that real wages follow only partially the initial demand
(monetary) increase. Hence, firms make investment choices more favorable to employment,
with the period ahead response of those variables greater than the corresponding to the
impact period. Figure 4.c shows that the aggregate capacity utilization rate increases,
since the monetary policy shock does not impact on the productive capacity of input-
producing firms. The consideration of adjustment costs in investment and habit formation
in consumption make the model’s impulse responses closer to the results in the empirical
10A complete set of results comparing this specification of the model with respect to alternative cases is
avalible from the author on request.
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literature, with Figure 4.d and Figure 4.e illustrating this issue. In particular, the reduction
in the elasticity of investment to the real interest rate and the persistence in consumption,
put downward pressure on the real and nominal interest rates. Thus, the model is able to
generate a liquidity effect of monetary policy as shown in Figure 4.f and Figure 4.g. The
behavior of the mark-up is displayed in Figure 4.h, where one can observe that this variable
moves counter-cyclically. The positive demand (monetary) shock moves marginal revenue
upward and, given that prices increase less than in the fully flexible case, the mark-up
decreases. Finally, Figure 4.i illustrates the dynamic behavior of inflation. Interestingly,
we can observe a “hump-shape” response of this variable. Altogether, the model provides
a good approximation to underlying consumer and firm behavior over the monetary policy
horizon, that is, the short-run.
Figure 5 displays the impact responses of selected model variables to a series of cu-
mulated monetary policy shocks, illustrating in this manner the asymmetric behavior of
the model economy. The experiment consists of a moving the economy away from the
steady-state through a series of money supply shocks. Figure 5 shows the results of such
an experiment for selected model variables. One can observe that as the economy departs
from its initial situation corresponding to a long-run average level of the capacity utiliza-
tion rate of 82%, the impact of the similar monetary policy shock has a lower effect on
quantity variables such as output, utilization, employment and investment. The intuition
is the following: when a monetary policy shock occurs, the marginal revenue curve of input
producing firms shifts upwards, leading to an increase in the equilibrium level of output
and prices; the mark-up decreases due to the fact that nominal price stickiness; altogether,
this implies an upwards shift in the labor demand curve, resulting in an increase in the
real wage rate as well as in the equilibrium level of employment; to the extent that the
monetary policy shock does not affect firms’ productive capacity, output also increases;
the liquidity effect induces a reduction in the nominal and real interest rate, what stimu-
lates investment and consumption; Due to the existence of constraints in firms’ productive
capacity, further expansionary policies will have less impact on employment and a higher
effect on prices. In particular, Figure 5.f shows the cumulative response of the wholesale
price level, that features a remarkable non-linear convex shape. Certainly, this experi-
ment illustrates the fact that the same policy actions have significantly different effects
depending on the extent to which productive resources are being used in the economy.
In order to illustrate the non-linearities in a more clear manner, we present the impulse
responses to a monetary policy shock for different degrees of capacity utilisation. Specif-
ically, we show how similar policy actions can have significantly different impact effects
depending on the state of the economy. We consider two states: “high-capacity” and
“low-capacity”, where each one corresponds to a long-run level of the aggregate capacity
utilization rate. As it is shown later, these two states implicitly depend on the degree of
idiosyncratic uncertainty, that is, on σ2v. Accordingly, the magnitude of firm-level uncre-
tainty should not be viewed as a fixed structural parameter, but a stochastic component of
the economy. Indeed, there is strong empirical evidence suggesting the counter-cyclically
nature of idiosyncratic risk.11 Hence, we compute impulse response functions with respect
11Campbell et al. (2001) show that a wide range of disaggregated firm-level volatility measures move
together counter-cyclically. Higson et al. (2002) found evidence of a negative correlation between the rate
of growth of gdp and the cross sectional variance of growth rates of sales.
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to a first-order approximation about two states of the economy is performed. To justify
the validity of this procedure, one can think of our exercise as an approximation to the
computation of “generalized” or “state-dependent” impulse response functions.12 Figures
6 show the different responses of output and inflation in the two capacity regimes.
4 Capacity Utilization and Staggered Pricing
The previous section looked at the effects of exogenous changes in the money supply
and technology level in the context of a model featuring nominal price adjustment costs
and production inflexibilities. In this section, we proceed to analyze the implications of
the kind of production inflexibilities discussed above with a different source of nominal
price stickiness. The results obtained from this analysis shown how changes, for instance,
in monetary policy are transmitted to a number of macroeconomic variables and, more
importantly, how the restrictions on firms’ ability to adapt their production processes
to a changing environment generates an asymmetric response of those macroeconomic
variables.
Much of recent research in monetary economics aims at analyzing monetary policy
as an endogenous component of the modeling framework. An important question in this
context, that we explore here, asks how should the monetary authority respond to different
shocks. Given the fact that the behavior of the economy depends on the magnitude of the
production inflexibilities, the response of the monetary authority should also depend on
these issues.
In the previous section, we have considered the existence of quadratic price adjustment
costs as a plausible source of monetary non neutralities. However, a large body of the so
called New Keynesian literature has considered the modelling approach of Calvo’s (1983)
staggered price contracts. The underlying idea in this context is that each (intermediate)
firm resets its price in any given period only with some probability, independently of other
(intermediate) firms and of the time elapsed since the last adjustment.13 In the sequel,
we consider a simplified version of the model presented above equipped with this kind of
nominal friction. Specifically, we abstract from capital and capacity accumulation and just
focus on the implications of variable capacity utilization for the performance of monetary
policy. To that end, we, first, present a log-linear version of the model; Then, we introduce
staggered prices á la Calvo in order to analyze the dynamics of inflation..Importantly,
the exact form of the equation describing such dynamics depends on the manner sticky
prices are modelled -we derive a Phillips curve relation that nests the conventional New-
Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC).
4.1 The New Keynesian Phillips Curve
Following the Calvo (1983) setup, we assume that firms adjust their price infrequently and
that the opportunity to adjust follows an exogenous Poisson process. Each period there is
a constant probability (1− ϕ) that the firm will be able to adjust its price, independently
of past history. Now, there are two sources of idiosyncratic uncertainty: one related to
12This concept of impulse response function has recently been proposed in the econometric literature to
analyze non-linear economic dynamics. See, for instance, Potter (2000) and the references therein.
13 It can be shown that there is an isomorphism between the two pricing mechanisms cited above. See
Roemberg (1987) for details.
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the productivity (input-demand) of each intermediate firm and another one related to the
ability of a firm to change its price. We maintain the assumption that firms choose their
price before the realization of the idiosyncratic demand shock. Hence, the timing is the
following: each period begins with the realization of the aggregate (technology) shock,
then, the idiosyncratic price shock is realized and a proportion ϕ of firms re-optimize their
price; Finally, the productivity (input-demand) shock is realized and the production and
employment take place.
Let Pnewt denote the price of an intermediate-goods producing firm that can change its
price in a given period t. Notice that our notation does not allow the price to depend on
the specific firm j. We do this following well known results in the literature of staggered
price models that claim that all firms who can re-optimize their price at time t choose the
same price. Thus, the optimization problem associated with this pricing mechanism is the
following:
maxEt
∞X
k=0
(βϕ)k∆t+kEv {Yt+k} [Pnewt −MCt+k] , (32)
where MCt+k ≡ Wt+k/ (At+kXα) is the nominal marginal cost. This problem is subject
to the expected demand of the intermediate good in each period which is given by:
Ev {Yt+k} =
µ
Pnewt
Pt+k
¶−²
Yt+k
Z v˜tt+k
0
vdF (v) + Y¯
Z ∞
v˜tt+k
dF (v) .
Notice that Pnewt influences firms profits only as long as it cannot re-optimize its price and
this happens for k periods with probability ϕk, hence the discount factor(βϕ)k in (32).
Notice also that the critical value of the idiosyncratic productive (demand) shock in any
given period t+ k depends on the price chosen at period t
v˜tt+k =
Y¯
Yt+k
³
Pnewt
Pt+k
´−² . (33)
Once the problem has been introduced, its solution is characterized by the following
expression:
Pnewt =
Et
P∞
k=0 (βϕ)
k
∆t+kEv {Yt+k}MCt+kΓ
¡
v˜tt+k
¢
λ
Et
P∞
k=0 (βϕ)
k
∆t+kEv {Yt+k}
£
1− λ
¡
1− Γ
¡
v˜tt+k
¢¢¤ , (34)
where Γ (v˜t+k) is as defined in (14), that is,
Γ (v˜t+k) =
R v˜tt+k
0 vdF (v)R v˜tt+k
0 vdF (v) + v˜
t
t+k
R∞
v˜tt+k
dF (v)
(35)
and λ ≡ ²/(²− 1). We can see that when ϕ = 0, the price (34) reduces to
Pt =
Ã
²Γ
¡
v˜tt
¢
²Γ (v˜tt)− 1
!
Wt
AtXαt
,
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which is similar to (13) when φp = 0, that is, the flexible price under capacity constraints;
Moreover, when no input producing firm is supply constrained, Γ
¡
v˜tt
¢
= 1 and the optimal
price is the standard constant markup over marginal costs:
Pt =
µ
²
²− 1
¶
Wt
AtXαt
.
In order to find an intuitive reading of the optimal price (34), we log-linearize it about
the steady state. This leads to the following expression, where symbol “b ” represents the
percentage deviation of the variable with respect to its steady state,
bPnewt = (1− βϕ) ∞X
k=0
(βϕ)k
hbΘct+k + dMCt+ki , (36)
where bΘct+k is a log-linear approximation of the distribution of output across firms, that
is, a log-linear approximation of
Γ
¡
v˜tt+k
¢
λ
1− λ
¡
1− Γ
¡
v˜tt+k
¢¢ .
Hence, when the proportion of firms at capacity is large, that is, when 1−Γ
¡
v˜tt
¢
is close to
one, any increase in the level of economic activity will produce an additional effect on the
inflation rate due to the presence of capacity constraints in firms’ production processes.
Additionally, we can write (36) asbPnewt = (1− βϕ)³bΘct + cmct + bPt´+ (βϕ) bPnewt+1 (37)
where mct is the log of the real marginal cost (in terms of intermediate-goods), that is,cmct = cWt − bPt − bzt, (38)
where bzt = log (At/A).
If the law of large numbers holds, a fraction (1− ϕ) of firms will reset the price at each
point in time. The evolution of the aggregate input price index therefore is
Pt =
h
ϕP 1−²t−1 + (1− ϕ) (Pnewt )
1−²
i 1
1−²
,
which in log-linear terms reads:bPt = ϕ bPt−1 + (1− ϕ) bPnewt .
Combining the aggregate price index with equation (37) results in the following version of
the NKPC in terms of wholesale inflation:
πt = βEtπt+1 +
(1− ϕ) (1− ϕβ)
ϕ
³bΘct + cmct´ . (39)
Notice that when no firm is capacity constrained, equation (39) results in the conventional
NKPC. The latter is a stochastic difference equation describing the dynamics of inflation,
with marginal costs as the only driving force. However, when production inflexibilities
are present, the behavior of inflation depends also upon the term bΘct . This term measures
the tightness of the production inflexibilities in the economy, that is, a measure of the
proportion of firms at capacity.
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5 Concluding Remarks and Extensions
This paper provides a formal approximation to the issue of asymmetries within the quanti-
tative monetary macroeconomics literature. The overall message arising from the present
analysis is that the same policy actions have significantly different effects depending on the
extent to which productive resources are being used in the economy. These results have
been obtained under a framework that considers the interaction of endogenous capacity
utilization (derived from productive constraints and firm heterogeneity) and market power,
together with a monetary structure that assumes nominal price stickiness. The source of
the asymmetry is directly linked to the bottlenecks and stock-outs that emerge from the
existence of capacity constraints in the real side of the economy. These constraints act as
a source of amplification of monetary shocks and generates asymmetries in the response
of key macroeconomic variables. These effects interact additionally with those emerging
from the imperfectly-competitive environment that characterizes the intermediate-good
sector through optimal mark-up changes.
There are two immediate extensions to the present analysis: One would involve the
computation of optimal monetary policy in this context. An important implication of the
capacity constraint hypothesis is that the Phillips curve displays a convex shape. This is a
feature of the economy that has relevant consequences for the performance of a monetary
policy aimed at controlling inflation and it provides support for arguments favoring a tough
anti-inflationary stance by the monetary authority.14 With a convex Phillips curve, the
more stable output is, the higher the level of output will be in the economy on average. The
thinking behind this result is that given the lags in the effects of monetary policy, there
is an incentive for pre-emptive tighten responses to inflationary pressure. Specifically, if
central bankers act in this way, it will prevent the economy from moving too far up the
level where inflation begins to rise more rapidly, thereby avoiding the need for a larger
negati ve output gap i n the future to reverse thi s large rise in inflation. 15 As a result,
the response of the monetary authority to shocks should be asymmetric. In this regard,
Schaling (1999) and Dolado et al. (2003) show that a convex Phillips curve leads to an non-
linear interest rate rule, where the weighting coefficients are state-dependent. Sims (2001)
finds a clear improvement of a state-dependent interest rate rule over a fixed-parameter
linear specification. Deriving the optimal policy rule and comparing its performance with
respect to standard formulations constitutes an interesting line of future research.
A second extension of this work involves an econometric estimation of the capacity-
based Phillips curve derived above. In this manner, we could quantify the dynamics of
inflation that cannot be appropriately captured with the specifications considered in the
standard literature.
14Nobay and Peel (2000) have shown that the analysis of optimal discretionary monetary policy under a
non-linear Phillips curve yields results that are in marked contrast with those obtained under a conventional
linear paradigm.
15Several recent paper have analyzed this issue by means of stochastic simulations in a model with
an asymmetric output-inflation nexus. See, for instance, Clark, Laxton and Rosen (2001) and Tambakis
(2002).
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Appendix 1
The Transformed Model Equations
Notice that in equilibrium, most of the model nominal variables grow at the rate of
growth of money supply. Hence, all nominal variables, except the nominal interest rate,
are divided by the final-goods price level, Pt−1,.in order to induce stationarity. Accord-
ingly, we define mt ≡ Mt/Pt−1 and πt ≡ Pt/Pt−1. The stationary model for the case
of an exogenous monetary policy rule consists of eleven equations corresponding to the
optimal choices of households, final-good firms, intermediate-good firms, as well as the
monetary authority, there is one equilibrium condition corresponding to the final-goods
market. Altogether, these equations determine a process for prices {πt, pt, Rt, wt}∞t=0 a
quantity vector {Kt,Xt, Ct, Lt, Yt,mt}∞t=0 and a proportion of firms {F (v˜t)}∞t=0. Addi-
tionally, there are three exogenous processes {zt, µt}∞t=0 related to technology and money
supply shocks {εz,t, εµ,t}∞t=0. Finally, the idiosyncratic shock, vt, follows a log-normal dis-
tribution function with unit mean and variance equal to σ2v. The model equations are the
following:
Final-Goods Firms:
Pt
Pt
=
½Z v˜t
0
vdF (v) + v˜
²−1
²
t
Z ∞
v˜t
v
1
² dF (v)
¾ 1²−1
. (A.1.1)
v˜t =
Y¯t
pt−²Yt
(A.1.2)
Intermediate-Goods Firms:
pt =
²Γ (v˜t)
(²Γ (v˜t)− 1)
½
wt
AtXαt
− φpEt
n
Υ˜t − βΥ˜t+1
o¾
, (A.1.3)
with
Υ˜t+h = ∆˜t+h
µ
pt+h
pt+h−1
πt+h
π
− 1
¶µ
pt+h
pt+h−1
πt+h
π
¶
Yt+h
Ev (Yt+h−1)
for h = 0, 1
and
∆˜t+h ≡
Uc,t+h
πt+h
Et {uc,t (Ψt +Wt)}− βEt
½
uc,t+1
µ
(1− δ)Ψt+1 +
µ
Kt+2
Kt+1
¶
Wt+1
¶¾
= (A.1.4)
βEt
½
uc,t+1 (1− F (v˜t+1))
µ
φt+1
πt+1
¶µ
Y¯t+1
Kt+1
¶¾
,
Et
(
uc,t+1φt+1
µ
Y¯t+1
Xt+1
¶"µ
α (²− 1)
v˜t+1
¶Z v˜t+1
0
vdF (v)−
Z ∞
v˜t+1
dF (v)
#)
= 0, (A.1.5)
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with
φt+1 ≡
µ
pt+1 −
wt+1
AtXαt+1
¶
,
Lt =
p−²t Yt
AtXαt
Z v˜t
0
vtdF (vt) +
Kt
Xt
Z ∞
v˜t
dF (vt) (A.1.6)
Households:
uC,t = βEt
½
uC,t+1
πt+1
¾
+ um,t, (A.1.7)
Et
½
uC,t − βRt
uC,t+1
πt+1
¾
= 0, (A.1.8)
−VLt
uCt
= wt, (A.1.9)
Final-Goods Market Equilibrium:
Yt = Ct + INt + A˜p,tYt, (A.1.10)
with
A˜p,t =
φp
2
µ
pt
pt−1
πt
π
− 1
¶2
,
Monetary Authority
mt+1
mt
=
1 + µt
πt
. (A.1.11)
that determine the equilibrium vector of prices {πt, pt, Rt, wt} , the equilibrium vector of
quantities {Kt,Xt, Ct, Lt,Yt,mt} and a proportion of firms {F (v˜t)} . The two exogenous
processes
µt =
¡
1− ρµ
¢
µ+ ρµµt−1 + εR,t , (A.1.12)
zt = ρzzt−1 + εz,t, (A.1.13)
characterize the evolution of {µt, zt} .
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Appendix 2
Implementation Numerical Solution Method
The solution approach involves the consideration of each conditional expectation as an
endogenous variable. The associated expectation error, which is also treated as endogenous
variable, is added to the model. Hence, define:
W1,t ≡ Et
½
uC,t − βRt
uC,t+1
πt+1
¾
and substitute the expectation in equation (A.1.8) by W1,t. Moreover, add to the model
the following equation:
W1,t−1 = uC,t−1 − βRt−1
uC,t
πt
+ ξ1,t,
where ξ1,t is the expectation error. Next, define
W2,t ≡ Et
(
uc,t (Ψt +Wt)−
βuc,t+1
³
(1− δ)Ψt+1 +
³
Kt+2
Kt+1
´
Wt+1 − (1− F (v˜t+1))
³
φt+1
πt+1
´³
Y¯t+1
Kt+1
´´)
and substitute the expectation in equation (A.1.4) by W2,t. Moreover, add to the model
the following equation:
W2,t−1 =
(
uc,t−1 (Ψt−1 +Wt−1)−
βuc,t
³
(1− δ)Ψt +
³
Kt+1
Kt
´
Wt − (1− F (v˜t))
³
φt
πt
´³
Y¯t
Kt
´´)+ ξ2,t.
Next, define
W3,t ≡ Et
(
uc,t+1φt+1
µ
Y¯t+1
Xt+1
¶"µ
α (²− 1)
v˜t+1
¶Z v˜t+1
v
¯
vdF (v)−
Z v¯
v˜t+1
dF (v)
#)
and substitute the expectation in equation (A.1.5) by W3,t. Moreover, add to the model
the following equation:
W3,t−1 =
½
uc,tφt
µ
Y¯t
Xt
¶·µ
α (²− 1)
v˜t
¶Z v˜t
v
¯
vdF (v)−
Z v¯
v˜t
dF (v)
¸¾
+ ξ3,t.
Finally, define
W4,t ≡ Et
n
Υ˜t − βΥ˜t+1
o
and substitute the expectation in equation (A.1.3) by W4,t. Moreover, add to the model
the following equation:
W4,t−1 =
n
Υ˜t−1 − βΥ˜t
o
+ ξ4,t.
Notice that now there are four new variables corresponding to the expectation errors,
namely,
©
ξ1,t, ξ2,t, ξ3,t, ξ4,t
ª
; thus we need four extra equations.16 These equations are the
16When considering a forward-looking interest rate rule, we have to consider another expectation variable
related to future inflation.
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stability conditions calculated in the algorithm based on a linear approximation of the
model to a non-stochastic steady state. Specifically, the linearized system can be written
as follows:
Γ0Yt = Γ1Yt−1 +Ψ$t +Πηt,
where the vector Yt consists of fifteen equations corresponding to the four conditional
expectation variables {W1,t,W2,t,W3,t,W4,t} and the eleven decision-equilibrium variables
{pt, Rt, wt,Kt,Xt, Ct, Lt,Yt,mt,πt, v˜t}; the vector $t consists of the two exogenous state
variables {zt, µt} ; and the vector ηt consists of the four expectation errors
©
ξ1,t, ξ2,t, ξ3,t, ξ4,t
ª
.
Next, premultiplying by the inverse of Γ0, one obtains a transformed system with an
identity matrix in Yt
Yt = Γ
−1
0 Γ1Yt−1 + Γ
−1
0 Ψ$t + Γ
−1
0 Πηt. (40)
Characterizing the equilibrium dynamics of the model under the optimal commitment
policy implies solving the set of difference equations. Typically, the matrix Γ0s is singular,
hence the “QZ” decomposition is a convenient way of solving such a system of equations.
In this regard, the square matrices Γ0s and Γ
1
s can be decomposed as
Γ0s =MsΛsZ
H
s and Γ
1
s =MsΩsZ
H
s ,
where ZHs is the complex conjugate of Zs; the matricesMs and Zs are unitary and Λs and
Ωs are upper triangular. Letting wt = ZHs Yt, we can multiply (40) by Ms to get
Λswt = Ωswt−1 +MsΘs +MsΠηt +MsΨsεt (41)
The “QZ” decomposition is reordered so that the largest of the generalized eigenvalues
{ωii/λii} in absolute value appear at the lower right. Accordingly, the system (41) is
partitioned so that |ωii/λii| ≥ ϕ¯ for all i > m and |ωii/λii| < ϕ¯ for all i ≤ m, where ϕ¯ is a
single bound on the maximal growth rate of any component of Yt. The resulting system
is ·
Λ11s Λ
12
s
0 Λ22s
¸ ·
w1,t
w2,t
¸
=
·
Ω11s Ω
12
s
0 Ω22s
¸ ·
w1,t−1
w2,t−1
¸
+
·
Ms,1•
Ms,2•
¸
(Θs +Ψsεt +Πηt) , (42)
where the second block corresponds to the unstable eigenvalues17. We can write the
((2(n+ n1) + k)−m)× 1 vector w2,t as
w2,t =
¡
Λ22s
¢−1
Ω22s w2,t−1 +
¡
Λ22s
¢−1
Ms,2• (Θs +Ψsεt +Πηt) , (43)
which letting χt ≡Ms,2• (Θs +Ψsεt +Πηt) and defining Hs =
¡
Λ22s
¢−1
Ω22s , becomes
w2,t ≡ ZHs,2•Yt = Hsw2,t+1 +
¡
Λ22s
¢−1
χt+1.
Because this set of equations corresponds to the unstable eigenvalues, it must be solved
towards the future, which makes w2,t dependent on the whole future path of χt. Proceeding
in this manner and under the assumption that (Hs)
tw2,t → 0 as t→∞, we obtain
w2,t = −
∞X
l=1
(Hs)
l−1 ¡
Λ22s
¢−1
χt+1.
17Note that some diagonal elements of Λ11s , but not of Λ11s , may be zero. Moreover, if Λs and Ωs have
a zero in the same position, then the system is incomplete, since some equation is a linear combination of
the others.
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Sims (2001) shows that this discounted sum of future values of linear combinations of χt
that defines w2,t must be equal to its conditional expectation. As a result, a stable solution
exists only if the column space of Ms,2•Ψs is contained in that of Ms,2•Π. If Ms,2•Ψs has
full column rank, one manner of testing the condition for the existence of a solution is by
regressing the columns ofMs,2•Ψs on the columns ofMs,2•Π to see if the resulting residuals
are all equal to zero. If Ms,2•Ψs has full row rank, then its column space automatically
includes any other space of the same dimension.18
The condition for the existence of a stable solution becomes also sufficient when the
innovations of the structural shocks are serially uncorrelated, that is, Et (εt+1) = 0 for all
t. In this case, a non-explosive solution for Yt simply becomes
w2,t ≡ ZHs,2•Yt = 0 for all t, (44)
where ZHs,2,• is the appropriate submatrix of ZHs . Moreover, the stability conditions imply
a set of relationships between the vector of rational expectation errors ηt and the vector of
innovations εt; Specifically, taking into account (43), the stability condition requires that
for every vector εt one can find, at least, a vector ηt that offsets the impact of εt on w2,t.
This means that
Ms,2•Ψsεt +Ms,2•Πηt = 0 for all t. (45)
The vector ηt, however, need not be unique. A necessary and sufficient condition for
uniqueness is that the row space of Ms,1•Π.be contained in that of Ms,2•Π. Moreover,
whenever a solution exists, it is possible to write
Ms,1•Π = ΦsMs,2•Π,
for some matrix Φs computed using a single value decomposition procedure.
Taking into account the precedent result, and the conditions (44) and (45), the system
in (42) becomes
Λ11s w1,t = Ω
11
s w1,t−1 + (Ms,1• −ΦsMs,2•) (Θs +Ψsεt) ,
which, by the definition of w1,t, results in
Yt = αs + βsYt−1 + φsεt, (46)
with
αs ≡ Zs,1•
¡
Λ11s
¢−1
(Ms,1• −ΦsMs,1•)Θs,
βs ≡ Zs,1•
¡
Λ11s
¢−1
Ω11s Z
H
s,1•,
and
φs ≡ Zs,1•
¡
Λ11s
¢−1
(Ms,1• −ΦsMs,1•)Ψs.
and This is a complete set of equations for Yt satisfying the condition that its solution
grows at a slower rate than ϕ¯t. If the solution is not unique, the system (46) generates one
of the multiple stable solutions to (40).
18 If Ms,2•Ψs has neither full row nor column rank, one has to use other methods, such as the single
value decomposition -Sims (2000) offers details in this respect.
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Notice that uniqueness does not hold, for instance, when the number of expectation
errors n2 exceeds the number of explosive eigenvalues. In such a case, it is possible to
introduce expectation errors that are unrelated to the fundamental uncertainty εt without
destabilizing the system. Lubik and Shorfheide (2002) show that the full set of solutions
to (45) is characterized by
ηt = −Ps,•1 (zs,11)−1 Ls,•1Ms,2•Ψsεt + Ps,•2η˜2,t, (47)
where Ps and Ls are orthonormal matrices and zs is a diagonal matrix, that corresponds
to the singular decomposition of Ms,2•Π, that is,
Ms,2•Π = PszsL0s = Ps,•1zs,11L0s;
the vector η˜2,t forms what is called reduced form sunspot shocks, and it is defined through
the decomposition of the forecast errors ηt as
ηt = Ls,•1η˜1,t + Ls,•2η˜2,t,
where η˜1,t are the component of the forecast errors due to the fundamental shocks. Recall
that if the number of expectation errors equals the number of explosive eigenvalues, the
solution is unique and the second term in (47) drops out. If the latter are lower than the
former, the system (45) does not provide sufficient restrictions to identify the elements of
ηt. In this case, the solution is not unique.
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TABLE 1: PARAMETER VALUES
Costly Price Adjusmtent Model
Risk Aversion σ 1
Consumption/leisure share η 0.35
Inverse Labor Supply Elasticity ϕ 0.8
Habit Persistence h 0.7
Intertemporal Discount Rate β (1.03)−0.25
Capital Share α 0.33
Elasticity Intermediate Goods ² 6
Depreciation Rate δ 0.018
Fixed Cost of Production Ψ 0.3
Price Adjustment Costs φp 4.05
Capital Adjustment Costs φk 318
Variance Idiosyncratic Shock σ2v 0.75
Persistence preference shock ρξ 0.9
Standard deviation preference shock σξ 0.03
mean preference shock ξ 1
Persistence technology σz 0.95
Standard deviation technology σz 0.0065
Persistence monetary growth rate ρµ 0.5
Mean monetary growth rate µ 1.016
Standard deviation monetary shock σµ 0.003
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Figures
Figure 1: Labor and Real Wage Response to Monetary Policy Shock
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Figure 3: Impulse Responses to a Technology Shock
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Output Response to a 1% Technology Shock
Figure 3.b
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Employment Response to a 1% Technology Shock
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Capacity Utilization Rate Response to a 1% Technology Shock
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Figure 3 (continued)
Figure 3.d
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Investment Response to a 1% Technology Shock
Figure 3.e
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Consumption Response to a 1% Technology Shock
Figure 3.f
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Mark-Up Response to a 1% Technology Shock
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Figure 3 (continued)
Figure 3.g
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Inflation Rate Response to a 1% Technology Shock
Figure 3.h
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27
Quarters after Shock
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
%
 S
te
ad
y 
St
at
e 
D
ev
ia
tio
n
Nominal Interest Rate Response to a 1% Technology Shock
Figure 3.i
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27
Quarters after Shock
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
%
 S
te
ad
y 
St
at
e 
D
ev
ia
tio
n
Real Interest Rate Response to a 1% Technology Shock
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Figure 4: Impulse Responses to a Monetary Policy Shock
Figure 4.a
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Output Response to a 1% Shock in Money Growth Rate
Figure 4.b
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Figure 4 (continued)
Figure 4.d
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Figure 4.e
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Figure 4.f
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Figure 4 (continued)
Figure 4.g
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Figure 4.h
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Figure 4.i
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Figure 5: Responses to Cumulated Monetary Policy Shock
Figure 5.a
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Figure 5.b
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Figure 5 (continued)
Figure 5.d
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Figure 6: Responses to Monetary Policy Shock: Two-Capacity Regimes
Figure 6.a
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Figure 6.b
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Figure 7: Responses to Monetary Policy Shock: Baseline Model
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No Adjustment Costs and No Habit
Figure 7.b
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Figure 7.c
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